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1. Introduction 
It might seem impertinent to begin a presidential address to a society of historians of 
economic thought by raising the question of why we – as historians of economic thought – 
exist, and whether our existence is in any sense justified.1 And this sense of impertinence 
betrays the fact that neither our core intellectual goals, nor the efforts we make to satisfy a 
certain social demand, are as able as we would have liked to justify the kind of work we are 
doing. This is rather uncomfortable; and might even at times have led some of us to cast 
envious glances towards our colleagues specialized in, say, fractional calculus or 
biochemistry, not to mention banking and finance. 
This is an enduring discomfort, which can be traced back to the birth of economics as an 
autonomous discipline. And Jean-Baptiste Say proposed a sweeping remedy in the “Abridged 
history of the progresses of political economy” which concludes his Cours complet 
d’économie politique pratique: let us get rid of our history, he enjoined, as other disciplines 
are wont to do once they are sufficiently mature (Say 1828, vol. 2, pp. 540-41). Yet it seems 
that the remedy, though still advocated today by a number of doctors, has been incompletely 
adhered to: thus the same discomfort remains, the history of economic thought still exists, and 
self-searching questions are still raised about its future, often focusing on how we do the 
history of economic thought, as if this could provide the answer to the question of why we do 
it (see the contributions gathered in Weintraub (ed.) 2002). Most of the previously published 
 
* Phare, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne – 106-112, boulevard de l’Hôpital – 75647 Paris Cedex 13 – 
France. E-mail: andre.lapidus@univ-paris1.fr. 
1 This paper develops a general argument presented in the Presidential Address to the 2018 ESHET Conference 
in Madrid, borrowed in particular from Lapidus (1996; 2016). 
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Presidential Addresses to the ESHET conferences (that is, from the 2006 edition onward), for 
instance, assigned a prominent place to the justification of the history of economic thought 
through an investigation of the ways in which we practice it (Heinz Kurz 2007, Maria-Cristina 
Marcuzzo 2008, Annalisa Rosselli 2013, Hans-Michael Trautwein 2017); and for the others 
(Harald Hagemann 2011, José Luis Cardoso 2015) it was at least implicit in their discussions 
of tradition and of its possible transmission. 
Despite having persisted since the beginning of the 19th century, about three decades ago the 
need for a justification took on a new character as a result of Mark Blaug’s pioneering 
introduction of a typology of approaches to the history of economic thought (Blaug 1990). His 
typology spread throughout our community, quickly becoming canonical – the kind of thing 
with which you agree or disagree, but which you can hardly bypass. And its influence was all 
the more pervasive in that the typology gave birth to conflicting positions that firmly 
distinguished two opposing ways of doing the history of economics, typically referred to as 
Historical Reconstruction and Rational Reconstruction, to which were added two subsidiary 
approaches, Geistesgeschichte and Doxography (section 2).  
This canonical typology was presented as borrowed from an important paper by Richard 
Rorty (1984), whose concern was the historiography of philosophy. But it was a special 
interpretation, resting on Blaug’s own reading of Rorty, which set aside the possibility of a 
fifth genre introduced by Rorty, Intellectual History. Yet taking into account the possibility of 
this fifth genre opens the path to a non-canonical typology, blurring the border between 
Historical Reconstruction and Rational Reconstruction and lessening the divide between 
them, while also promising to challenge contemporary knowledge and enrich it with 
statements which do not belong to it (section 3). 
The idea that the history of economic thought also has something to do with present-day 
changes in economic theory obviously preceded the birth of Blaug’s canonical typology. It 
could easily be traced back to Schumpeter (1954) and, since the mid-twentieth century, has 
been a recurrent preoccupation among historians of economics, as typified by several 
presidential addresses to the ESHET. As such, that idea has shaped the long story of the way 
we have done history of economic thought in recent decades, leaving room for the progressive 
systematization of non-canonical typologies of approaches (section 4). 
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Drawing on this evolution, I have proposed a typology comprising three alternative 
approaches, distinguished on the basis of the way they conceive of the link between 
statements,2 old and contemporary (Lapidus 1996; 2016): these approaches are extensive, 
retrospective, and intensive. The extensive approach, quite general in its scope, refers to any 
account of old statements in terms of other old statements, whatever their nature. The 
retrospective approach accounts for old statements in terms of the present-day economic 
statements which they prefigure. Finally, the intensive approach addresses old statements 
insofar as they can produce new statements, thus renewing our present knowledge (section 5). 
Unlike the extensive and retrospective approaches, however, the very possibility of an 
intensive approach seems at odds with its relatively thin outcomes – witness, for instance, the 
paucity of handbooks in the history of economic thought which provide a firm and long-
lasting expression of their authors’ methodological perspective. Taking the works of Sraffa 
(1951; 1960) and Sen (2002) as examples, I will argue that this is a consequence of the 
intensive approach being heuristic, and hence its results being by nature transient, such that it 
is destined to remain poised between the extensive and retrospective approaches. As a result, 
among the three approaches available to historians of economic thought – the extensive, 
retrospective, and intensive approaches – it is the latter which appears as a privileged route by 
which the history of economic thought can begin to engage with economic theory (section 6). 
2. The canonical typology 
The story of the canonical typology of approaches in the history of economics begins in 1962, 
when Blaug published the first edition of his well-known Economic Theory in Retrospect. In 
the introduction, he drew a sharp distinction between two approaches: relativist and absolutist 
(Blaug 1962, pp. 1-2). This today is quite familiar to us: according to the relativist approach, 
each theory is to be considered – and justified – in its own context. The absolutist approach, 
on the contrary, allows a ranking of earlier theories according to the present state of 
knowledge.  
 
2 I employ the underspecific word “statement” precisely for its wide meaning, intending thereby to encompass 
judgements, propositions, beliefs, and so on. 
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Blaug’s position at this time is also well known: while not dismissing the relativist approach, 
he clearly expressed sympathy with the absolutist viewpoint. And the later editions of 
Economic Theory in Retrospect reiterated the same position, at least until his influential 1990 
paper on the historiography of economics. This paper had the notable aim of introducing the 
community of historians of economic thought to a typology designed by a major philosopher, 
Richard Rorty, who had posited a distinction between four “genres” in the history of 
philosophy (Rorty 1984). 
The result of Blaug’s reading of Rorty’s paper was a kind of compounding of two typologies. 
The first was Blaug’s old typology, in which he contrasted the absolutist and the relativist 
views. The second was his own interpretation of the four genres identified by Rorty: 
Geistesgeschichte, Historical Reconstruction, Rational Reconstruction, and Doxography. This 
gave birth to a refinement of the initial relativist–absolutist typology which we today 
acknowledge as a canonical, that is, as a familiar gateway for taking up methodological issues 
in the history of economic thought.  
This refinement, relying on Rorty’s four genres, was produced as follows. Firstly, Blaug 
showed rather little interest in Geistesgeschichte [history of the spirit], which aims at showing 
how such-and-such a question became important in the work of a past author: typically, it 
might concern whether the Napoleonic wars bear any responsibility for Ricardo’s concern 
with a decrease of the profit rate. He then considered Historical Reconstruction as equivalent 
to his own conception of relativism, which he split between moderate and strict relativism, the 
latter being dismissed on the grounds that it is untenable. As regards absolutism, meanwhile, 
he asserted the equivalence between, on the one hand, Rational Reconstruction and 
Doxography and, on the other hand, strict and degenerate absolutism, before also dismissing 
Doxography, which he regarded as an ill-founded approach in the history of economic 
thought (Blaug 1990, pp. 27-28). What remains are the two well-known approaches Historical 
Reconstruction and Rational Reconstruction, which strive towards different kinds of 
rephrasing of what a past author said: the first one rephrases, or accounts for, past authors’ 
answers in their own terms, or in the terms of their time; the second rephrases, or accounts 
for, past authors’ answers in our own terms. Blaug at the time unequivocally favored Rational 
Reconstruction at the expense of Historical Reconstruction, thus upholding his preference for 
absolutist rather than relativist approaches. 
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Blaug (1962) 
Blaug (1990) 
Blaug (1997) 
Blaug’s Rorty (1984) Blaug’s Blaug (1962) 
  Geistesgeschichte   
Relativism 
Historical  
Reconstruction 
Strict Relativism Historical  
Reconstruction Moderate Relativism 
Absolutism 
Rational  
Reconstruction 
Strict Absolutism Rational  
Reconstruction 
Doxography Degenerate Absolutism 
Table 1. The canonical typology 
Subsequent to Blaug’s 1990 paper, what I have called the “canonical typology” became 
influential (see Table 1). First of all, obviously, it was influential on Blaug himself: he 
supplemented his introduction to the 5th edition of Economic Theory in Retrospect by 
“sharpening” his position, as he put it, through adding the distinction between Historical 
Reconstruction and Rational Reconstruction, which he explicitly viewed as “almost the same” 
as his prior distinction between relativism and absolutism (Blaug 1997, p. 7). 
Geistesgeschichte and Doxography were no longer discussed in the subsequent reeditions. But 
the 1990 paper also exerted a palpable and long-lasting influence upon historians of economic 
thought, who turned to it each time questions arose about the legitimacy of their methodology 
(see, for instance, in the years which followed its publication, Samuelson, Patinkin and Blaug 
1991, Backhouse 1992, Dockès and Servet 1992, Khalil 1995, Lapidus 1996).  
As we know, of course, this is not the end of the story: for, some years later, Blaug changed 
his mind, his preferences shifting from Rational to Historical Reconstruction (Blaug 2001). 
His 2001 paper, in turn, fueled the ongoing and at times schismatic debate on the 
methodology of the history of economic thought (in the special issue of the Erasmus Journal 
for Philosophy and Economics devoted to Mark Blaug in 2013, see for instance the papers by 
John Davis and by Harro Maas). But although Blaug did change his mind about the kind of 
approach he favored, he nonetheless remained faithful to the canonical typology inherited 
from Rorty. Yet what such persistent faithfulness concealed was that in passing from Rorty’s 
hands to Blaug’s, and thus transiting from the history of philosophy to the history of 
economics, the initial typology had evolved. Rorty’s original typology had faded into Blaug’s: 
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yet, as had already been shown (see Shionoya 2009), Rorty’s original paper was also open to 
alternative interpretations, and was not committed to the relativist–absolutist interpretation, as 
Mark Blaug’s interpretation was. 
3. Back to Rorty 
For instance, when Rorty discussed the issue of Historical Reconstruction versus Rational 
Reconstruction, he didn’t view it in terms of the relativist–absolutist opposition. Rather, he 
borrowed it from a paper by Quentin Skinner published in 1969, and he followed Skinner in 
defining Historical Reconstruction as an approach in which no one 
“can eventually be said to have meant or done something which he could never be 
brought to accept as a correct description of what he had meant or done” (Skinner, 
1969, p. 28). 
In contrast, Rational Reconstruction is an approach in which we are not searching for what an 
author meant, but rather for what is meant by him or her. That is, we are seeking the outcome 
of a forced conversation, in alternative contexts, between the past author and us today. Rorty 
proposed to adopt a restricted use of “meaning”, so as to reserve the words “meaning” and 
“significance” for Historical Reconstruction and Rational Reconstruction respectively (Rorty 
1984, pp. 54-55). 
The opposition between Historical Reconstruction and Rational Reconstruction, understood as 
an opposition between what an author meant (the meaning) and what is meant by his or her 
works (the significance), seems rather powerful. For instance, it clearly leads us to conclude 
that asking what Adam Smith would have said about digital economics is not at all 
nonsensical: we would only say that this is something that falls under Rational 
Reconstruction, not Historical Reconstruction. 
Here I would like to draw the reader’s attention to another aspect of the Skinnerian origins of 
Rorty’s distinction between Historical Reconstruction and Rational Reconstruction: in arguing 
that it rests on the possibility of bringing past authors to accept an interpretation of what they 
said, we blur the border between the two types of reconstruction. Just think, for instance, of a 
simple statement which might pertain to Christopher Columbus:3 “he discovered America”. 
 
3 The example continues Rorty’s discussion. See Rorty 1984, p. 53. 
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At first sight it’s a Rational Reconstruction, since nothing like the American continent was 
part of Columbus’s knowledge. But assuming we adopt Skinner’s criterion, do we really 
believe that “he could never be brought to accept it as a correct description of what he had 
meant or done” – that is, that he could not accept the kind of information provided to him? On 
the one hand, this can be viewed as introducing an alternative context, and hence justifying 
such a claim would be regarded as Rational Reconstruction; but, on the other hand, how could 
we be so presumptuous as to imagine that we could in no way bring Christopher Columbus to 
accept this enlarged, rather than new, context? In which case, “Christopher Columbus 
discovered America” would be a Historical, not a Rational, Reconstruction. 
The existence of a fuzzy, and thus debatable, border between Historical Reconstruction and 
Rational Reconstruction led Rorty to view his three relevant genres (Geistesgeschichte, 
Historical Reconstruction, Rational Reconstruction) not as independent approaches which 
might be mixed contingently in the work of such-and-such historians of ideas, but rather as an 
example of what he regarded as a “Hegelian triad” (Rorty 1984, p. 68), whose working opens 
the path to a fourth genre – or, better, a fifth, if Doxography is taken into account, despite its 
exclusion by Rorty, much like Blaug would also do. In the canonical typology this fifth genre 
is set aside: yet the entire final section of Rorty’s paper is devoted to it. He called it 
“Intellectual History”. 
Intellectual History is presented by Rorty as raising issues which do not belong to our present 
knowledge. This is obviously the case with marginal or forgotten figures: taking them into 
account might result in a revision in the headings of the chapters of canonical histories of 
economic thought (in the history of philosophy, for instance, he mentions the relatively minor 
place of Diderot; Rorty 1984, p. 69). But it is also a way of saying that what an author meant, 
in the Skinnerian sense, some centuries ago, might also become meaningful for us today. 
Intellectual History is obviously a way to challenge the fuzzy border between Historical 
Reconstruction and Rational Reconstruction. It yields an enlargement of the interpretations of 
a past author which – again in Skinner’s words – he “could be brought to accept […] as a 
correct description of what he had meant or done”. Take as an example one of the main 
messages which Morishima found in Marx. What he called the “fundamental Marxian 
theorem” was published in its basic version in his book on Marx in 1973 and in its generalized 
version one year later. Broadly speaking, this theorem states (in its 1974 version) that in a 
quite general linear model of production, with alternative techniques and joint production, a 
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positive rate of surplus-value is a necessary and sufficient condition for a positive rate of 
profit (Morishima 1974, pp. 621-22). One might discuss at length the question of how we can 
know whether this kind of relation between the rate of surplus-value and the rate of profit was 
something which Marx actually meant. Let us assume it was. In 1973, however, despite 
certain pioneering contributions like that of Okishio (1963), this didn’t really belong to the 
economic knowledge of the time when Morishima published his book. Thus: 
1. You could argue that the so-called fundamental Marxian theorem belonged to 
Intellectual History, being an issue which didn’t belong to our present knowledge as 
economists. 
2. Nonetheless, you could also say that it is a Rational Reconstruction, since Morishima 
used the properties of non-negative square matrices and linear programming, which 
Marx clearly could not have known about. 
3. But if the equivalence between the signs of the rate of surplus value and of the rate of 
profit was really something which Marx meant, there is no reason to view these formal 
developments as an unsurmountable obstacle, according to the Skinnerian criterion. (I 
mean, there are no reasons other than Marx’s possible intellectual limitations – which 
would be a rather odd argument.) Thus Morishima’s fundamental theorem could be 
viewed as an alternative account, meeting the requirements of a Historical 
Reconstruction, of what Marx had said in some passages from Capital, Book 3. 
This illustrates the fact that when a statement falls within the sphere of Intellectual History, it 
might well be a Rational Reconstruction, but it might equally be a Historical Reconstruction. 
This non-canonical typology, which includes Intellectual History as a fifth genre, could be 
derived from Rorty’s paper; yet it is rather different from – and far less conflictual than –  the 
canonical typology we are used to, which was nonetheless also derived from Rorty’s paper. 
4. Towards a non-canonical typology 
Independently of Rorty’s development of the idea of Intellectual History, there is a 
longstanding and familiar intuition that what we can learn from the past might, at least, be 
meaningful for economists today. More than thirty years before the publication of Rorty’s 
paper, in his History of Economic Analysis Schumpeter noted that in economics “much more 
than in physics have results been lost on the way or remained in abeyance for centuries” 
(Schumpeter 1954, p. 5), such that it was the task of historians of economics to revive them. 
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And a similar position is evinced by more recent authors, albeit stated from different points of 
view or in different terms. Illustrating his claim by reference to monetary theory, Cesarano 
(1983) argued that economic knowledge was increasing in the long run, whereas in the short 
run its trend showed oscillatory movements, and thus there was room for smoothing them by 
means of the history of economic thought. In the same way, Hollander (1987) noted that the 
replacement of one theory by another often appeared as the result of a change in what he 
called the “focus of attention”, and that it was one of the tasks of historians of economic 
thought to move the focus back to the theory that had been abandoned. This point, he claimed, 
was illustrated by the revival of the Smithian distinction between productive and unproductive 
labour in order to explain the weakness of the British rate of growth (Hollander 1987, p. 1). 
Drawing on Lakatos, Negishi argued that research programs in economics at times enter 
periods of hibernation, and that it was the role of historians of economic thought to bring them 
out of hibernation, as Keynes or Sraffa were supposed to have done when reading respectively 
Malthus or Ricardo (Negishi 1989). 
Even Blaug’s paper from 2001 might be regarded in this way. At first sight it relies on the 
same canonical typology, but the approach he favoured had changed: he gave up on Rational 
Reconstruction, and turned to Historical Reconstruction on the basis of an efficiency 
argument according to which new propositions, which didn’t belong to present economic 
knowledge, might be found in the works of past authors. The idea had clearly been in the air 
for a long time – long enough that it was unnecessary to make reference to Rorty’s 
contribution on this point. Blaug, then, could view it as part of a Historical Reconstruction, 
enlarged to encompass Geistesgeschichte – yet without noting that for Rorty, the approach 
involved in the efficiency argument fell under Intellectual History, not Historical 
Reconstruction. 
In much the same way, previous Presidential Addresses to the ESHET Conferences have 
expressed concern about the possibility that the history of economic thought might be able to 
renew contemporary economic knowledge. These addresses were opportunities to recall the 
identity of the discipline and its distinctiveness, even when its relation with other disciplines 
was also praised (like, for instance, economic history for Annalisa Rosselli in 2012; see 
Rosselli 2013). Among them, some were directly concerned with the kind of approaches 
which prevail in the history of economic thought. This was the case for Heinz Kurz’s 
contribution in 2006, Maria Cristina Marcuzzo’s in 2008, and Hans-Michael Trautwein’s in 
2016 (Trautwein 2017). 
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I would like to call our attention not to the differences between these perspectives – for of 
course there are differences – but rather to what they have in common. They have in common 
a special ambition of scouring the works of past authors in order to find ideas, propositions, 
or, as we might more generally put it, statements, which do not belong to present economic 
knowledge, and which potentially challenge it, and which might even contribute to its 
transformation. 
When compared with the canonical typology, they make its limitations obvious. All of them, 
in their own ways, promote a special vocabulary to support various typologies of approaches 
in the history of economic thought which might be related to the canonical typology; but they 
also all make room for approaches which search the works of past authors for issues which do 
not belong to our present knowledge, thus also opening the path to a non-canonical typology. 
This allows us to link them to Rorty’s five genres of historiography (see Table 2). 
Rorty (1984) Kurz (2006) Marcuzzo (2008) Trautwein (2017) 
Geistesgeschichte 
  
Historical 
reconstruction = 
{Contextual analysis, 
Historical narrative} 
Exploration of the 
past 
Historical 
reconstruction 
Exploration of the 
past / Correction 
Intellectual history Heterodoxy 
Textual exegesis / 
Quest for alternatives 
Exploration of the 
past / Blindspots & 
backtracking 
Rational 
reconstruction 
Whiggism 
Textual exegesis / 
Quest for ascendency 
Decoration 
Doxography Abbreviation 
Table 2. ESHET Presidential Addresses: towards a non-canonical typology 
Heinz Kurz (2006) pointed to heterodoxy as an alternative to “Whiggist” interpretations 
(according to terminology drawn from a 1931 book by H. Butterfield), which I relate to the 
canonical typology’s category of Rational Reconstruction. Cristina Marcuzzo (2008) noted 
the role of textual exegesis in the search for new ideas, and also of the quest for alternatives, 
though she viewed this as a kind of Rational Reconstruction. And, drawing on the idea that 
today’s increasing specialization in economics also increases the risk of neglecting the history 
of economic thought, Hans-Michael Trautwein (2017) found support in what he called blind 
spots identification and innovation by backtracking, which both require the highest skill in the 
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history of economic thought and are of the highest general interest. Clearly, the categories of 
heterodoxy, textual exegesis, quest for alternatives, blind spots identification, and innovation 
by backtracking, correspond to the search for new results (Schumpeter 1954), the historical 
smoothing of oscillations in economic theories (Cesarano 1983), the change in the focus of 
attention (Hollander 1987), and the awakening of hibernating research programs (Negishi 
1991). And, of course, they also correspond to Rorty’s Intellectual History, his fifth genre 
which fitted so badly into Blaug’s absolutist–relativist perspective that it found no place in the 
canonical typology. 
This, then, is the outline of the story of how we have done the history of economic thought in 
recent decades. It is the story of the birth of a canonical typology of approaches in the history 
of economic thought, and the story of its dissolution, which opened room for an alternative 
approach.  
5. A proposed typology 
We can put this point differently by focusing on the opposition between old and contemporary 
statements (see Lapidus 1996; 2016). I have used the term “extensive approach” for any 
account of old statements in terms of other old statements, irrespective of their nature, or the 
discipline in which they are located. This corresponds to what Blaug, after Rorty, called 
Geistesgeschichte or Historical Reconstruction. An obvious example of an extensive approach 
is Karl Pribram’s attempt, in his book published posthumously in 1983, to promote what he 
called a history of economic reasoning. Such an approach amounts to viewing economics as 
an application of principles of reasoning elaborated elsewhere. By “elsewhere”, he means the 
discipline which aims precisely at building principles of reasoning – that is, philosophy. 
Hence, in Pribram’s book one finds chapters on Thomist economics, Cartesian economics, 
and Kantian economics, respectively appealing to Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant. The 
intervention of philosophy in a historical account is only one example of an extensive 
approach: in fact the term covers a range of possibilities which are not usually considered 
together. For instance, a link might be established between a political situation and economic 
propositions: such could be the case if we follow Cannan (1892) in interpreting the 
contributions of Malthus, Ricardo, and West in February 1815, which led to a novel  
explanation of rent, as an impact in the field of economic theory of debates within the political 
field about the Corn Laws. Or, in the same way, we might be concerned with such a link if, 
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following Mitchell (1967–69), we paid special attention to technological and organizational 
change in accounting for changes in economic theory. 
In Figure 1, I have drawn up on the left a set of old statements, irrespective of whether they 
are by nature economic or not. Areas shaded in medium or strong grey represent the subset of 
what we consider to be theoretical statements in economics. Areas in light grey represent what 
we consider to be other kinds of statements. This reference to “we” is the irreducible mark of 
present knowledge, of which Rorty said that it could never be cancelled out, in any genre of 
historiography. Consequently, the extensive approach is simply a way to pass from old 
statements in economics to other old statements. 
I have used the term “retrospective approach” for any attempt to account for old statements in 
terms of the present-day economic statements which they prefigure. This obviously 
corresponds to Rorty’s categories of Rational Reconstruction and Doxography. An exemplary 
instance was given by Blaug himself when, with a certain sense of humour, he dedicated his 
famous handbook Economic Theory in Retrospect “to David Ricardo, my son”. This shows 
more clearly than any more sophisticated comment what adopting a retrospective approach 
involves: Blaug’s naming his own son after the famous economist reflects the manner in 
which we, like Blaug, view David Ricardo or any other past author much as if they were our 
children – that is, as people full of promise, who might yet be what we have already 
succeeded in becoming, and who reflect our current knowledge imperfectly, naïvely, and with 
less mastery than we now have.  
Again in Figure 1, I have set out on the right hand side, in medium grey, modern economic 
statements belonging to contemporary knowledge. The retrospective approach therefore 
amounts to linking an appropriate subset of old statements marked in medium grey with the 
set of modern statements. 
Now, it should be clear from Figure 1 that something structural is missing. Specifically, 
whereas the extensive approach potentially concerns all old statements, the retrospective 
approach concerns only those old statements which might be viewed as more or less accurate 
prefigurations of what today is known. Thus there is room to introduce a missing approach, 
which I have called the “intensive approach”. In Figure 1, this would be another way to relate 
old to contemporary statements. Old statements (in dark grey) are retained only insofar as 
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they do not prefigure modern statements, but can still produce new statements (also in dark 
grey), thus renewing present knowledge. 
Like the retrospective approach, the intensive approach is concerned with contemporary 
economic theory; but, like the extensive approach, it is not concerned with what we already 
know. And unlike either of these approaches, it is concerned with the challenges faced by our 
knowledge in its present state. My contention is that the intensive approach covers Kurz’s 
(2006) building of “heterodoxies”, Marcuzzo’s (2008) “quest for alternatives”, and 
Trautwein’s (2017) identification of “blindspots”. 
 
Figure 1. A non-canonical typology 
6. The intensive approach as a heuristic 
The intensive approach therefore supports the intuitive view that the history of economic 
thought is not simply self-sufficient – as it surely is on an extensive or retrospective approach, 
much like any academic practice in the history of ideas which doesn’t require further 
justification – but is also a way to contribute to advances in economics. But if so, this means 
that the history of economic thought should be counted among the possible means to feed into 
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economic theory. Thus besides the direct access to economic theory enjoyed by economists, 
and the indirect access which also belongs to economists trained in empirical or experimental 
economics, we should also add the access made available through the history of economic 
thought, which is no less real for being less commonplace. And access in this instance 
requires an intensive approach. 
Nonetheless, it turns out to be unexpectedly difficult to find evidence not only of the efficacy 
of the intensive approach, but even of its very existence: as if it was the missing piece of a 
puzzle which we can only imagine and in no sense hold in our hands. The extensive and the 
retrospective approaches were illustrated above by the handbooks of Karl Pribram (1982) and 
Mark Blaug (1962) respectively. Is there any handbook which might also illustrate the 
intensive approach? At the beginning of his History of Economic Analysis, Schumpeter 
argued that the history of economic thought was a proper means to find lost or idle ideas 
(Schumpeter 1954, p. 5). But in spite of its scholarly achievements, and of its enduring 
originality, Schumpeter’s book falls far from providing a significant example of an intensive 
approach, and rather provides its readers with numerous illustrations of the extensive or the 
retrospective approaches. It is all the more puzzling that, setting handbooks aside, we have to 
wrack our brains to find convincing instances of the intensive approach actually being 
employed. I can give only a few examples. 
For many of us, Sraffa’s introduction to the works of David Ricardo in 1951, and especially 
his interpretation of Ricardo’s so-called Essay on Profits (1815), in relation to his 1960 theory 
of the prices of production, might be viewed as an impressive illustration of what an intensive 
approach can do (see also Lapidus 1996; 2016). And as already mentioned, Morishima’s 
interpretation of Marx through his Marxian fundamental theorem might be another example 
(Morishima 1973; 1974), alongside Leijonhufvud’s reading of Keynes’s theory of 
unemployment (Leijonhufvud 1968), or Sen’s reading of Smith’s conception of poverty in 
relation to the capabilities approach, or of the impartial spectator in relation to open 
impartiality (Sen 2002). We could also add to this rather meager list some “if only” examples, 
suggesting that, with a few tweaks, history might have been different and have left more room 
for the intensive approach: if only Paul Romer had read Smith before his 1987 paper; if only 
Daniel Kahneman had read Bentham before his joint paper with Amos Tversky from 1979. I 
could go on wracking my brain, but I guess that what I intend to ask is already obvious: why, 
considering its potential importance, are there so few examples of the intensive approach in 
action? 
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The answer seems to be that, unlike the extensive or retrospective approaches, the intensive 
approach is by nature a transient approach. I’ll give two examples, drawn from those 
mentioned above. 
The first is Sraffa’s interpretation of Ricardo’s Essay on Profit in 1951. Let’s engage in the 
following thought experiment: we are transported back to 1951 and, despite this backward 
transportation, we remember everything of our lives except what is connected to Sraffa’s 
works from 1951 onwards. What would we think of Sraffa’s newly published introduction to 
his long-awaited first volume of the new edition of Ricardo’s works? Some of us would agree 
with Sraffa’s interpretation of the Essay, accepting the idea of the structural specificity of 
agriculture (corn made with corn), so that the profit rate might be viewed independently of 
prices, and rather as a ratio of homogeneous quantities. Others would not: but this is not my 
point. I want to draw our attention to the fact that at this time, in 1951, we would regard 
Sraffa’s introduction as a typical instance of what I’ve called an extensive approach. That is, 
an approach which accounts for what Ricardo did on the basis of his works, his 
correspondence and discussions, and on the basis of which we might draw inferences, rightly 
or wrongly, about what he meant. 
Now we are transported forward to 1960, and Sraffa publishes his Production of Commodities 
by Means of Commodities, in which he introduces the concept of a “basic commodity”, 
standing for a composite commodity produced by itself and labour. At this very moment, but 
only then, when reading and according credit to Sraffa’s appendix D on his sources (Sraffa 
1960, p. 93), and particularly to his understanding of the role of corn in Ricardo’s system, 
which he has generalized into the idea of the basic commodity, his approach appears as 
intensive: it was clear to the reader in 1960 that the subtitle of Sraffa’s book (“Prelude to a 
critique of economic theory”) was an understatement. He had gone far beyond a simple 
prelude to a critique, and instead supplied a positive alternative to the standard theories of 
prices. And he did this through his reading of a text nearly 150 years old,4 and by giving a 
solution to a problem he found therein. 
 
4 Strictly speaking, when Sraffa reviewed the circumstances in which he made his finding of the idea of a basic 
commodity, he himself cast doubt on the idea that he might have been led from his historical investigation to his 
analytical discovery: “It should perhaps be stated that it was only when the Standard system and the distinction 
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And after this? Continuing our journey through time, let us return to the present. Whatever 
our interest in the theory of prices of production and in its capacity to challenge other theories 
of prices, we must agree that it is now a part of contemporary knowledge (see, among others, 
Kurz and Salvadori 1995) – to such an extent that if we should try to explain, today, that what 
Ricardo wrote in 1815 was an intuition about a theory of prices of production where corn is 
the only basic commodity, this would be an example of a retrospective approach. That is, it 
would be an account of what Ricardo meant by what he said in 1815: a prefiguration of what 
we now know so well, and so much better than he did, two centuries later. 
My second example comes from Amartya Sen’s unwavering interest in Adam Smith, 
especially on matters related to individual behavior, justice, and moral philosophy. Some of 
his works focus directly on Smith: they were written either alone (Sen 1986; 2010a; 2010b; 
2011) or in collaboration with his wife Emma Rothschild (Rothschild, Sen 2006), whose book 
on Smith and Condorcet (Rothschild 2001) seems to have had great influence on him. Others, 
although they deal with other issues, deliberately leave room for reminders of the link 
between what Sen is now doing as an economist and what Smith wrote some two centuries 
earlier (for instance, Sen 1987; 2002; 2009). As with Sraffa’s relationship with Ricardo, from 
the mid-1980s onwards Sen was giving an interpretation of Adam Smith which contrasted 
with some major interpretations then extant, exemplified for Sen by Stigler’s (1971) account, 
to which he systematically referred (see, for example, Sen 1986, p. 31; 1987, pp. 17-22), 
notably in order to call into question the “self-interest” line of reading of Adam Smith which 
was used, Sen said, to support a “cramped and simplistic theory of human rationality” (Sen 
2010a, p. 54). All of this falls within an extensive approach whose conclusions might have 
been (and obviously were) debated. 
Yet although until 2002 Sen’s emphasis in his contributions on Smith seems mainly to have 
been on issues related to individual behavior, rules of conduct, and individual rationality, 
something different appeared after 2002, where his interest now seems to be morality and 
justice (see Bréban, Gilardone 2018). In his 2002 paper, he continued his re-interpretation of 
Smith, extending it now to the impartial spectator which Smith had introduced in the Theory 
of Moral Sentiments (1759). He understood Smith’s account of the impartial spectator as 
 
between basics and non-basics had emerged in the course of the present investigation that the above 
interpretation of Ricardo’s theory suggested itself as a natural consequence” (Sraffa 1960, p. 93).  
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supporting the idea that public reasoning on justice should include not only people directly 
concerned by the deliberation itself (the “focal group”), but also people from outside this 
group (Sen 2002, pp. 449-51). Again, such an interpretation, which Sen set in opposition to 
the Rawlsian one (Sen 2002, pp. 451-53), might be disputed (Ege, Igersheim, Le Chapelain 
2016; Bréban, Gilardone 2018); however, it remains an outcome of an extensive approach 
directed at reappraising some features of a major contribution by Adam Smith. 
On the other hand, however, and as confirmed in further works (Sen 2009), Sen explicitly 
drew on his interpretation of Smith’s impartial spectator in order to introduce the idea of 
“open impartiality” in his theory of justice (Sen 2002) – a theory of comparative justice which 
he views as rooted within a tradition that includes Smith and Condorcet, and which had been 
overshadowed by the transcendental tradition rooted in Hobbes or Rousseau, and now 
exemplified by Rawls’s theory of justice (Rawls 1971). This, in turn, is an example of an 
intensive approach which aims at challenging the Rawlsian theory of justice through reference 
to writings that are more than two centuries old. 
Sen refined his previous argument in 2009, when he published The Idea of Justice (dedicated 
to the memory of John Rawls). But things had changed since 2002: when discussing the link 
between Smith’s impartial spectator and open impartiality within a theory of comparative 
justice, he is now dealing with the relation between an account of the work of an old author 
and what he claims to be his legacy within contemporary academia. Hence the whole 
discussion can be viewed methodologically as engaged in a retrospective approach.  
For both Sraffa and Sen, what I have called the “intensive approach” therefore proves to be a 
transient approach in the history of economic thought, poised between the extensive and the 
retrospective paradigms. And it is because of this transient nature that the intensive approach 
is too fleeting, too short-lived, to give birth to an object as long-lasting as anything like a 
handbook in the history of economic thought. Yet the transient nature of the intensive 
approach is the consequence of its being a heuristic, whose potential effect is a transformation 
of present economic knowledge by means of historical investigation. No less, yet no more. 
The intensive approach is born from the extensive; and from the moment it is implemented, it 
is destined to vanish into the purely retrospective. 
On the one hand, for a historian of economic thought whose concern is to contribute, no 
matter how modestly, to the economic knowledge of her or his time, the transient nature of 
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the intensive approach might seem unappealing: no handbooks; no firm construction 
upholding the memory of one’s work; a visibility restricted only to major results like Sraffa’s, 
Morishima’s, or Sen’s. While, at the same time, one’s everyday results, all these minute 
potential changes to economic knowledge induced by close historical investigation, add up to 
barely any steps away from the field of history of economic thought towards that of 
economics. From this point of view, the history of economic thought may well appear to be a 
superfluous and excessively complicated detour, at least to the extent that it aims at the 
concrete transformation of economic knowledge on a par with empirical or experimental 
approaches to economics. 
But, on the other hand, the history of economic thought also effects an incredible extension of 
the number of past authors with whom today’s historians of economic thought may talk, share 
ideas, and jointly enter into new projects – at least in so far as they themselves are engaged in 
an intensive approach. In the introduction to the volume in which Rorty’s 1984 paper was 
published, the editors asked the reader to imagine a thousand-volume edition of a giant 
Intellectual History of Europe. To imagine also that all the authors whose works were 
discussed therein should be restored to life, and would all then read all of each others’ books, 
engaging in discussion, dialogue, dispute, and common projects (Rorty, Schneewind, Skinner, 
1984). 
Transposing this to economics and to what I’ve called the intensive approach, the present 
implication is that we may consider works which we normally view as belonging to the early 
history of our discipline, like Jevons’s Theory of Political Economy or Marx’s Capital, as 
having just been written. Moreover, this would also mean that they were written very shortly 
after Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which was itself published almost simultaneously with 
Quesnay’s Tableau économique, etc.: as if time were being compressed, though leaving 
history intact. And then we invite the authors to engage in dialogue with each other as well as 
with ourselves –  not only for the purposes of presentation, as if we wanted to enhance the 
impact of these authors’ works, for this is the least we can hope to do as historians of 
economic thought. No: it is above all a way to take what they wrote and thought seriously; so 
seriously that we are willing to confront it with what we as economists now know. Through 
what we write about them, they continue to challenge our knowledge, in continuum with what 
they did in their own periods.  
19 
 
Keynes, Jevons, Marx, Smith, Quesnay, and so many others: they are still with us. As 
historians of economic thought, we have often been charged with speaking with the dead. Yet 
this is precisely not what we do: we bring the dead alive, all of them. And we may be proud of 
it. 
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